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Abstract Major changes in the British welfare state were initiated during the 1980s in
response to the 1970s’ stagflation, rapid globalisation and the government’s inability to
ensure full employment: the relatively unrestricted payment of unemployment benefits was
replaced by a jobseekers’ allowance with applicants obliged to seek work actively and, if
required, undergo training. Public support for this shift lagged behind the policy intro-
ductions, but from 1997 on there was a major change in attitudes towards welfare bene-
ficiaries. Analysis of social attitude survey data for 1983–2011 shows this change occurred
during the decade of relative prosperity under the New Labour governments. There was a
growing concentration of anti-welfare attitudes across all social groups, regions and sup-
porters of the main political parties.
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1 Introduction
The British welfare state was constructed over the first half of the twentieth century, being
consolidated by the Labour government elected in 1945 which implemented in large part
the principles and mechanisms set out in the 1942 Beveridge report designed to slay the
five ‘giant evils’—squalor, want, disease, ignorance and idleness (Timmins 2001). Its
nature was widely welcomed across society as a response to the privations of the 1930s
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depression, the Second World War and the subsequent years of austerity and reconstruc-
tion, and its parameters were largely accepted and kept in place by subsequent Conser-
vative governments. Its provisions were extended through the next decades, but came
under increasing criticism from some economists, political philosophers and others,
leading to increased political conflict over the state’s role in economy and society.
The post-1945 welfare state was built on Keynesian foundations, based on a belief that
demand management could ensure a growing economy characterised by full employment,
in which welfare state provisions—such as unemployment benefit—catered for those
temporarily experiencing want; out-of-work benefits were a stopgap provision for workers
between jobs. This system broke down in the 1970s, when the economy was characterised
by stagflation and the onset of globalisation. An alternative—Schumpeterian (Jessop
1993)—model of welfare was promoted, notably by New Right think-tanks, and adopted
by Conservative politicians (Glennerster and Midgely 1991). The state’s main role of
demand management was to be replaced by supply management with a more flexible
labour market. Structural changes in the pattern of employment meant that unemployment
would be more frequent for many workers, and the state’s role was to minimise that risk
through retraining and other policies ensuring that people did not become dependent on
welfare benefits (Welshman 2013). The British welfare state was reoriented towards a new
welfare-to-work regime that promoted waged work, achieved in part by making unem-
ployment benefit levels decline in real terms—thereby encouraging unemployed workers to
move from benefits into paid work.1
Welfare reform not only involved a major reorientation of political, economic and social
beliefs, but also required a major shift in public attitudes. Without that, support for the new
policy orientation would be fragile and—according to the theorists—the country’s eco-
nomic prosperity threatened. That attitudinal shift was slow to gather pace, with many
remaining wedded to the Keynesian principles of full employment guaranteed by the
government and a beneficent welfare state for those unable to support themselves through
its well-established economic cycles (of so-called ‘boom-and-bust’). But this began to
change in the 1990s, as increasing proportions of respondents to inquiries such as the
British Social Attitudes annual surveys indicated declining support for the increasingly-
expensive system of benefits (see, for example, Hills 2014) on which—or so they were led
to believe by the media and some politicians—an increasing proportion of the population
were reliant. Living on benefits had become a ‘lifestyle choice’ it was claimed, as more
people ‘opted out’ of the workforce.
Although the main parameters of the post-1945 welfare state in Britain were generally
accepted, nevertheless—as political and other surveys demonstrated—there was always a
divide within society in support for its practices. In general, those most likely to be its
beneficiaries—the ‘working class’—were more committed to a high tax and spend policy
manifesto, associated with the Labour party, whereas others, while accepting the need for a
welfare state safety net, believed that a reduction in benefit entitlements and expenditure,
associated with tax cuts, offered a better route to general prosperity. As the latter approach
appeared increasingly unsustainable, a new generation of politicians argued that the par-
tisan ideological split had to be healed and removed from the heart of party politics; a new
social contract was needed, it was argued, and a new set of post-welfare values was
1 Such changes had long been debated within the Conservative party, as exemplified by a 1961 paper
written by a future Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe: see http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
obituaries/geoffrey-howe-one-of-the-architects-of-the-thatcher-revolution-who-became-one-of-the-primary-
factors-a6689811.html.
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required for success in an economically-globalised world, requiring cross-class acceptance
of an alternative regime. How did that happen? Which groups changed most in their
attitudes and is there now greater uniformity in popular perceptions of the welfare state and
how it should operate? While there has been much work examining attitudes towards
welfare in the European context (e.g. Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Larsen 2008) as
well as more recent work exploring links between social attitudes and the changing
political economy of welfare state capitalism in the advanced economies (e.g. Deeming
2016) this article takes an entirely different and original approach, in that it exploits and
pools for the first time thirty years of national UK social survey data in order to chart the
changes in public opinion across social groups, time and place.
2 From the welfare to the workfare state
As part of their response to what they saw as the failings of Keynesian demand man-
agement the Thatcher and Major administrations (1979–1997) increasingly adopted poli-
cies whose goal was to encourage the unemployed back into work, and the young
unemployed—many of whom may not have had previous jobs—to undertake training and
other programmes designed to assist their entry into the labour market, the latter through a
wide range of job training schemes. By the late 1980s, for example, all claimants of
unemployment benefits had to show that they were ‘actively seeking work’. This position
was clearly enunciated in a speech by the then Secretary of State for Employment, Norman
Tebbit, who—in responding to a claim from within his own party that riots in 1981 were an
understandable response to unemployment—stated that ‘‘I grew up in the ‘30s with an
unemployed father. He didn’t riot. He got on his bike and looked for work, and he kept
looking till he found it’’ (usually referred to as his ‘on your bike’ speech).
But the general public did not appear to respond to this change in government tone and
ethos. As Crewe (1988) observes, under the Heath and Wilson/Callaghan governments in
the 1970s, public opinion shifted away from Keynesian solutions and moved right, but that
opinion moved back again to the left under the Thatcher governments of the 1980s. Such
trends appear to broadly conform to the ‘thermostatic model’ of opinion-policy relation-
ships. If trends in public opinion change (i.e. the ‘temperature’ set by the ‘thermostat’ goes
up or down) the government will respond to that change and shift policy again (see Soroka
and Wlezien 2005). Although Margaret Thatcher won two landslide general election
victories in 1983 and 1987 she did not create an enduring rightwards realignment in public
opinion regarding welfare reform, and especially attitudes towards out-of-work benefits;
the electorate opposed her governments ‘‘on the vast array of its specific policy initiatives’’.
(Indeed, Curtice 1988—argued that a regional divide in attitudes opened up during the first
two Thatcher administrations, although it was less substantial than that between the
occupational classes.) She had won her elections by default—faced by a Labour party
deemed unelectable by many and a split opposition with the rise of the Liberal-SDP
Alliance (Crewe and King 1995). Crewe concluded that ‘Much of Thatcherism will die
with Thatcher. Its permanent legacy at the level of the mass public will be very limited. It
will not have killed off popular socialism, at least not in its welfarist forms. A post-
Thatcher Labour government will inherit an electorate as friendly to its major objectives as
the 1979 electorate was to those of the Conservatives (Crewe 1989, 250; though see also
Dahrendorf 1988).
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Although welfare reforms in Thatcher’s third term had created an adult employment
training system, modelled on ‘workfare’ in the United States (Peck 2001), that included
full-time work done for the unemployment benefit plus an additional £10 top-up, no
coherent welfare-to-work regime had been put in place however. Welfare-to-work reform
was instead secured by the Labour party under Tony Blair, which while in opposition in
1994 established a Commission on Social Justice: its vision was of a welfare state oper-
ating as a ‘‘springboard for economic opportunity’’ rather than a ‘‘safety net in times of
trouble’’ (Peck 2001, 276: see also Driver and Martell 1998). Those who could not find
employment would be helped into the labour market by public works programmes—with
training and, where relevant, childcare provision assisting this transition.
By the time it came to power in 1997, the Blair New Labour government was committed
to a workfare regime—generally along lines developed in several States of the USA in the
preceding decade and adopted by Bill Clinton before his 1996 re-election campaign (King
and Wickham-Jones 1999): as Walker (1998, 35) put it:
Blair’s speeches, and the writings of his close colleagues, resonate with a pot-pourri
of US influences … Blair seems to accept that welfare has become a problem rather
than a solution, destroying the work ethic and other family values…
Under the Conservatives, the shift towards workfare was in the margins of employment
policies; under Blair and New Labour it became the ‘‘ideological cornerstone’’. As Peck
(2001, 262) describes it, Blair’s first post-election-victory speech focused on welfare
reform, clearly distancing his ‘New Labour’ project from ‘Old Labour’ by seeking to
‘‘reconnect the poor with waged work’’—what Blair termed the ‘Welfare to Work pro-
gramme’. Instead of being claimants of benefits, as in the past, the unemployed would
become jobseekers, and a main purpose of the welfare system was to help the unemployed
become employable (see Peck 2001, 308ff, and several of the essays in Powell 1999). Blair
himself explained the change as ‘‘We are … providing people with a ‘hand up’ not a ‘hand
out’; previous governments had been satisfied ‘simply to dole out money’ and a senior
Cabinet Minister characterised this ‘radical new approach’ as moving ‘‘people from being
passive recipients of benefits to active jobseekers looking and preparing for work with
access to training and job-focused activity’’ (both quoted in Hills 2014, 4). In future, while
people had rights within the welfare state, they also had responsibilities—those rights were
conditional on them fulfilling their side of the implicit social contract, which involved them
actively seeking work (or undertaking training to assist that process) in order to claim
benefits (Griggs and Bennett 2009). Thus Glennerster (2001, 385) concluded that in ret-
rospect Blair’s social policy would be seen as a decisive shift away from Labour’s previous
administrations’ positions: as ‘‘a move away from an all-inclusive universal welfare state—
never achieved in practice but always a dream’’—to what he, after Hills and Lelkes (1999),
termed ‘selective universalism’. To him—and subsequently to Hills (2014)—this shift in
social policy was successful in redistributing income and benefits towards those most in
need, but ‘‘taking the public with the new strategy will not be easy’’ (Glennerster 2001,
402).
Workfare programmes were extended under the Conservative-led coalition government
that took office in 2010, when the media and political rhetoric became much more
aggressive, pitting ‘hard-earning taxpayers’ against those wanting ‘handouts’—‘skivers
against strivers’; the ‘strivers’ wanted the welfare state to be fair not only to those who
were suffering unemployment and/or poverty as a consequence of the recession but also to
themselves, whose cost of living was being squeezed as incomes rose slower than prices
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and whose taxation was paying for the welfare recipients.2 Elements of the media adopted
this language (see Jones 2014; Garthwaite 2011; Wiggan 2012); in the Daily Mail, for
example, Walters and Carlin (2012) presented David Cameron’s decision to remove access
to unemployment benefits to those who refuse to seek work as getting behind the workers
and cracking down on the shirkers.
3 Changing attitudes to unemployment and welfare benefits, 1983–2012
So how widely-shared were these changes in attitudes? Which groups within society
changed most, when, where and why? To answer those questions we have assembled
relevant survey data covering a period of 30 years.
The data deployed for these analyses have been taken from the suite of attitudinal
questions employed in the annual British Social Attitudes’ (BSA) surveys: each question
has not been asked every year since the surveys commenced in 1983, but many have been
asked in the majority. Three have been selected for analysis here:
• ‘‘Around here most people could find a job if they really wanted one’’. Respondents
were asked if they agreed strongly, agreed, neither agreed not disagreed, disagreed, or
disagreed strongly with this statement. As our focus is on the growth in anti-welfare
sentiments, we collapsed this into a binary for all respondents—those who agreed or
strongly agreed were coded 1 and the remainder (including those who were neutral)
were coded 0.
• ‘‘Welfare benefits are either too low and cause hardship or too high and discourage
work’’. Those who agreed with the latter statement were coded 1 and all other
respondents were coded 0.
• ‘‘If benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to stand on their own two feet’’.
Those who agreed or agreed strongly with this statement were coded 1 and all other
respondents were coded zero.3
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the trends in the percentage of respondents coded 1 on each of
these variables, with the sequence divided into five sections according to who was Prime
Minster at the time (1983–1990—Margaret Thatcher, Conservative; 1990–1997—John
Major, Conservative; 1997–2007—Tony Blair, Labour; 2007–2010—Gordon Brown,
Labour; 2010–2012—David Cameron, Conservative leader of a Conservative-Liberal
Democrat coalition). There is a common pattern to all three graphs: the percentage of
respondents giving an anti-welfare response fell to its lowest levels during the early years
of Major’s premiership (i.e. at the beginning of the 1990s), but then increased through the
remainder of his term and virtually all of Tony Blair’s. Gordon Brown’s relatively short
period of power was marked by stasis on one of the indicators and decline on the other two,
and stasis was the main characteristic of the first years of the coalition government led by
David Cameron.
2 In his speech at the 2012 Conservative party conference, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George
Osborne, asked ‘Where is the fairness, we ask, for the shift-worker, leaving home in the dark hours of the
early morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of their next-door neighbour sleeping off a life on
benefits?’, although one of his colleagues claimed that similar language was used two years earlier by a
Labour Cabinet Minister who claimed that ‘many people on the doorstep at the last election felt that too
often we were for the shirkers, not workers’ (Jowit 2013).
3 Responses to the three variables were only very weakly correlated, so they were not combined into a
single attitudes to welfare variable.
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From the mid-1990 s on there was a strong trend in British attitudes away from a pro-
welfare stance and towards a neo-liberal, ‘workfare not welfare’, position, therefore. On
each of the three variables the percentage expressing the latter sentiment more than
doubled between the early years of John Major’s premiership and the end of Tony Blair’s.
Thenceforth there was little evidence of a return even to the levels of support for the
welfare state that characterised the last years of Margaret Thatcher’s administrations
Fig. 1 Changes in the percentage agreeing that there were sufficient jobs available locally. (The periods
with different Prime Ministers are divided by the vertical lines)
Fig. 2 Changes in the percentage agreeing that benefits are too high and discourage work. (The periods
with different Prime Ministers are divided by the vertical lines)
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although the percentage agreeing that the unemployed in their local area could find work if
they wanted to fell considerably after the financial crashes of 2008 following which
unemployment increased rapidly.
But did this change in attitudes occur equally across society: given that many studies
have shown marked differences across various groups in their attitudes, were there vari-
ations among socio-economic and -demographic groups in the extent of the switch? To
address that question, we fitted a series of baseline binary logistic regression models to
each of the three dependent variables. After several exploratory analyses, we selected ten
categorical variables for which there were statistically significant relationships, as
follows4:
• Age: respondents were grouped into three categories—15–24; 25–64; and over 64—
with the former as the comparator;
• Sex: female respondents are contrasted with males;
• Ethnicity: Black and Other Minority Ethnic group members (BME) were contrasted
with Whites (including all others);
• Religiosity: those respondents who indicated that they were religious were contrasted
with those who were not;
• Trade Union membership: those who were not members were contrasted with those
who were;
• Employment Status: those who were either unemployed or not economically active
were contrasted with those members of the adult population who were employed
(including the self-employed);
Fig. 3 Change in the percentage who agreed that if benefits weren’t so generous people would learn to
stand on their own two feet. (The periods with different Prime Ministers are divided by the vertical lines)
4 Given the large sample sizes, it is likely that even small differences would have statistically significant
results—though in the great majority of those displayed here the differences were significant at the 0.001
level or better; the size of the coefficients is thus of more substantial importance than their statistical
significance.
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• Occupational Class: those whose current or most recent occupation was either in the
routine non-manual or manual categories were contrasted with those in the salariat;
• Educational Qualifications: those with either qualifications below degree level or with
no qualifications were contrasted with those having degrees;
• Region: those living in either the other eight English regions, or Wales, or Scotland
were contrasted with those living in Northeast England (in general, the country’s most
disadvantaged region); and
• Period: those living in the years when either Major, Blair, Brown or Cameron was
prime minister were contrasted with those living under the Thatcher administration.
The results of these regressions are in Table 1, with for each variable the b coefficient,
its standard error (se) and its associated exponent (odds ratio).
A number of general patterns emerge from these regressions. Those aged 25–64 were
less likely to be anti-welfare than either young adults or older persons, for example (with
an exception for the latter group on the variable relating to the availability of jobs locally).
Those who were of a religious disposition were more likely to be anti-welfare than those
who were not religious, as were those with lower or no qualifications compared to those
with degrees; the unemployed and (to a lesser extent) those outside the labour force were
less likely to be anti-welfare, not surprisingly, than those in employment, and trades union
members were more likely to be pro-welfare than those who were not.
There was less consistency on some of the other variables, however. Females were more
likely than males to believe that the level of benefits was too high, for example, but less
likely to consider that lower welfare payments would encourage people to stand on their
own two feet; there was no significant difference between the two in their views on the
availability of jobs locally.
The blocks of significant coefficients—all of them positive—for regions show that anti-
welfare opinions were more common (holding constant all of the other variables) else-
where in Great Britain than they were in the Northeast of England. Those geographical
variations were patterned commensurate with the well-known north:south divide in the
British economy, society and polity. Whereas respondents in the other northern English
regions (Northwest, and Yorkshire and the Humber) and in Scotland were 20–30 per cent
more likely to be anti- than pro-welfare than those in the Northeast (as shown by the
exponents), those in England’s southern regions—the economically more-advantaged areas
in recent decades—were above 50 per cent more likely to be anti-welfare on the first two of
the dependent variables, with London and the Midlands regions between the two groups.
Finally, the variables representing which Prime Minister was in power identify differ-
ences consistent with the trends shown in Figs. 1, 2 and 3. Respondents were less anti-
welfare during Major’s premiership than they were under Thatcher’s (though the difference
was statistically insignificant on the third variable). There was then a substantial increase
during the next two premierships—with the anti-welfare levels being between 1.7 and 3.0
times as large under Blair and then Brown respectively as they were under Thatcher, with
that difference either levelling-off or, in the case of the jobs availability variable, sub-
stantially falling again under Cameron.
4 A dividing society?
Most of those differences are not unexpected; they reflect the well-established social
divides within British society. But given the major shift towards anti-welfare attitudes from
the mid-1990s on, was that change consistent across all groups, or did it vary within and
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Table 1 Binary logistic regressions of three anti-welfare indicators
Jobs for unemployed Level of benefits Incentive to work
b se exp b se exp b se exp
Constant –0.15 0.03 –0.57 0.03 –0.47 0.03
Age (comparator—15–24)
25–64 –0.22 0.03 0.80 –0.10 0.03 0.90 –0.09 0.03 0.91
65? –0.13 0.05 0.88 0.34 0.04 1.41 0.57 0.05 1.76
Sex (comparator—Male)
Female 0.03 0.02 1.03 0.07 0.02 1.07 –0.09 0.02 0.92
Ethnicity (comparator—White)
BME 0.16 0.05 1.17 –0.09 0.04 0.91 0.37 0.05 1.45
Religiosity (comparator—not religious)
Religious 0.07 0.12 1.07 0.13 0.02 1.13 0.09 0.02 1.09
Trade union (comparator—Union member)
Not a member 0.29 0.02 1.33 0.21 0.02 1.24 0.23 0.02 1.26
Employment status (comparator—employed)
Unemployed –1.10 0.05 0.33 –1.39 0.05 0.25 –1.16 0.06 0.32
Not economically active –0.45 0.03 0.64 –0.31 0.03 0.73 –0.31 0.03 0.74
Occupational class (comparator—salariat)
Other non–manual 0.10 0.03 1.10 0.09 0.03 1.01 0.12 0.03 1.13
Manual 0.17 0.03 1.18 –0.16 0.02 0.85 0.07 0.03 1.07
Educational qualifications (comparator—degree or higher)
Less than degree 0.47 0.03 1.60 0.57 0.03 1.76 0.60 0.03 1.82
No qualifications 0.62 0.04 1.86 0.52 0.03 1.68 0.83 0.04 2.29
Region (comparator—Northeast)
Northwest 0.21 0.05 1.23 0.32 0.05 1.38 0.16 0.05 1.18
Yorkshire/Humber 0.28 0.05 1.32 0.28 0.04 1.32 0.21 0.05 1.23
East Midlands 0.33 0.05 1.40 0.43 0.05 1.54 0.30 0.05 1.35
West Midlands 0.49 0.05 1.64 0.55 0.04 1.74 0.34 0.05 1.40
Southwest 0.50 0.05 1.66 0.60 0.05 1.82 0.32 0.05 1.38
Eastern 0.59 0.05 1.80 0.67 0.05 2.00 0.43 0.05 1.53
London 0.48 0.05 1.62 0.40 0.04 1.48 0.29 0.05 1.35
Southeast 0.70 0.04 2.02 0.56 0.04 1.75 0.30 0.05 1.35
Wales 0.49 0.05 1.64 0.31 0.05 1.36 0.22 0.05 1.24
Scotland 0.26 0.05 1.29 0.31 0.05 1.36 0.15 0.05 1.16
Government (comparator—Thatcher)
Major –0.55 0.04 0.28 –0.27 0.03 0.77 –0.03 0.04 0.98
Blair 0.72 0.04 2.06 0.55 0.03 1.74 0.63 0.04 1.88
Brown 0.81 0.05 2.24 1.12 0.04 3.07 1.08 0.05 2.95
Cameron 0.38 0.04 1.46 1.12 0.04 3.085 1.14 0.05 3.11
N 47,080 59,157 47,061
Nagelkerke R2 0.12 0.12 0.11
% correctly classified 64.6 62.2 62.4
Coefficients statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold
Coming together in a rightward direction: post-1980s…
123
between them? To address that question, we fitted a further series of exploratory models in
which all of the independent variables were interacted with the four period variables. The
final versions, shown in Table 2, included four of those sets of interactions—with age,
trade union membership, occupational class, and educational qualifications—but excluded
the others because of insignificant and/or insubstantial findings (these were for sex, eth-
nicity, religiosity, and employment status: those variables were included in the final
model—as was region (see below)—but not their interactions with period). Table 2 shows
only the coefficients for those variables that were interacted with period in the final
version.
With the first independent variable—age—there is little patterning for the first anti-
welfare variable (the availability of jobs locally) but substantial differences on the other
two. For example, the block of coefficients for the ‘raw’ variable shows that in the first
period those aged 25–64 and, even more so, those aged over 64 were much more likely to
say that benefit levels were too high and that if they were lower people would have a
greater incentive to stand on their own two feet, than were those who were under 25:
British people became more anti-welfare as they aged, it seems. But the significant neg-
ative coefficients for the interaction variables show that the later the period the narrower
that gap between the two older age groups and the under-25s: there was a convergence in
anti-welfare attitudes over time. The same is true with the patterns for trade union
membership; in the first period non-members were substantially more likely to be anti-
welfare on all three indicators than were members (exponents of 1.78, 1.52 and 1.40
respectively). But negative coefficients for the interaction variables—especially on the first
two indicators—again show those differences narrowing over time. A very similar pat-
terning occurs with the educational qualifications variable: those lacking qualifications
were more likely to be anti-welfare than those with degrees, for example, but that dif-
ference is reduced across the three decades: again, convergence across the groups over
time. Only with the occupational classes is there a less clear-cut situation: where the
coefficients are significant, they suggest that manual workers became more anti-welfare in
the middle periods.
That shift resulted from movement away from the pro-welfare stance over time, rather
than a movement of those who were initially anti-welfare in the other direction. This is
illustrated in Table 3 using one of the questions—whether benefits are so high that they
discourage work—for the three variables with significant interaction coefficients in
Table 2. The gap between the youngest and the oldest group was 25 points during the
Thatcher premiership, with the oldest the least pro-welfare. It halved during Major’s term
as Prime Minister, halved again under Blair, and was negligible for the last two periods.
The main shift was in the attitudes of the younger groups: between the periods the per-
centage of those aged 15–24 sharing the anti-welfare attitude increased by 152 per cent,
whereas for those aged 25–64 the increase was 69 per cent and for those aged 65 and over
just 28 per cent. The young were won over to attitudes already held by a majority of the
old. The next block shows that the main change in answers to that question was for trades
unionists, with no difference between them and non-members in their attitude to benefit
levels in the final period. And finally, the difference between those with degrees and those
without any qualifications halved between Thatcher’s and Cameron’s premierships, with
the change in former group’s percentage thinking benefit levels were too high being twice
that of the latter. In all three groups, therefore, the change was in the same direction: those
who expressed pro-welfare positions—who initially believed benefits were too low—
moved towards those who were anti-welfare, with no substantial counter-movement in the
other direction.
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Table 2 Binary logistic regressions of three anti-welfare indicators with interaction terms
Jobs for unemployed Level of benefits Incentive to work
b se exp b se exp b se exp
Age (comparator—15–24)
25–64 –0.10 0.12 0.91 0.27 0.08 1.31 0.31 0.14 1.36
65? 0.10 0.15 1.10 1.01 0.10 2.75 1.09 0.16 3.00
Trade union (comparator—union member)
Not a member 0.58 0.08 1.78 0.42 0.06 1.52 0.33 0.09 1.40
Occupational class (comparator—salariat)
Other non-manual –0.03 0.10 0.98 –0.08 0.07 0.92 –0.04 0.11 0.97
Manual –0.04 0.10 0.97 –0.35 0.07 0.70 –0.14 0.10 0.87
Educational qualifications (comparator—degree or higher)
Less than degree 0.93 0.15 2.54 0.90 0.11 2.45 0.91 0.18 2.49
No qualifications 1.07 0.16 2.91 0.86 0.12 2.36 1.26 0.19 3.54
Government (comparator—Thatcher)
Major –0.06 0.21 0.95 0.20 0.16 1.22 0.22 0.25 1.25
Blair 1.33 0.20 3.77 1.31 0.14 3.70 1.31 0.23 3.69
Brown 1.49 0.25 4.42 2.31 0.20 10.09 2.14 0.27 8.49
Cameron 1.19 0.21 3.30 2.48 0.17 11.97 2.14 0.25 8.53
Interactions
Government-age
Major—25–34 –0.29 0.14 0.75 –0.29 0.10 0.75 –0.29 0.16 0.75
Blair—25–34 –0.06 0.13 0.95 –0.47 0.09 0.63 –0.46 0.15 0.53
Brown—25–34 –0.04 0.18 0.96 –0.62 0.14 0.54 –0.64 0.19 0.63
Cameron—25–34 –0.15 0.15 0.86 –0.57 0.12 0.57 –0.46 0.15 0.53
Major—64? –0.36 0.17 0.70 –0.49 0.13 0.61 –0.30 0.18 0.74
Blair—64? –0.13 0.16 0.88 –0.79 0.11 0.46 –0.54 0.17 0.58
Brown—64? –0.26 0.21 0.77 –1.01 0.18 0.37 –0.94 0.22 0.39
Cameron—64? –0.39 0.18 0.68 –1.04 0.14 0.36 –0.86 0.19 0.42
Government-trade union
Major—not a member –0.27 0.09 0.76 –0.08 0.07 0.93 –0.05 0.10 0.96
Blair—not a member –0.36 0.09 0.70 –0.26 0.06 0.57 –0.11 0.10 0.90
Brown—not a member –0.37 0.12 0.69 –0.56 0.11 0.77 –0.26 0.13 0.77
Cameron—not a member –0.23 0.10 0.80 –0.33 0.08 0.72 –0.15 0.11 0.86
Government–occupational class
Major—other nonmanual 0.03 0.12 1.03 0.05 0.09 1.06 0.15 0.12 1.16
Blair—other nonmanual 0.17 0.11 1.18 0.14 0.08 1.15 0.17 0.12 1.19
Brown—other nonmanual 0.27 0.15 1.30 0.18 0.12 1.20 0.24 0.15 1.28
Cameron—other nonmanual 0.09 0.12 1.10 –0.01 0.10 0.99 0.14 0.13 1.45
Major—manual 0.17 0.11 1.19 0.14 0.08 1.15 0.25 0.12 1.29
Blair—manual 0.23 0.10 1.26 0.24 0.07 1.27 0.24 0.11 1.27
Brown—manual 0.29 0.14 1.34 0.32 0.12 1.38 0.23 0.14 1.25
Cameron—manual 0.17 0.12 1.19 0.16 0.09 1.17 0.07 0.12 1.07
Government-educational qualifications
Major—below degree –0.13 0.17 0.88 –0.25 0.13 0.78 –0.06 0.20 0.95
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5 A changing geography
A further set of analyses focused on the regional variables alone, exploring whether the
country became more or less divided spatially over the period. (Support for the country’s
main political parties showed a pronounced spatial divide during the 1980s, that narrowed
in the 1990s but widened again from 2001 on: Johnston et al. 1988, 2005.) For this, all of
the other variables were retained in the models but the number of regions was reduced to
six, based on the pattern of coefficients in Table 1: North (Northeast, Northwest, and
Yorkshire and the Humber); Midlands (East and West); South (Eastern, Southeast and
Southwest); London; Wales; and Scotland. The relevant coefficients for those six regions,
the five periods, and the interactions between those two groups are in Table 4; the coef-
ficients for the other variables retained from the previous models are not reported again to
Table 2 continued
Jobs for unemployed Level of benefits Incentive to work
b se exp b se exp b se exp
Blair—below degree –0.47 0.16 0.62 –0.24 0.12 0.79 –0.27 0.19 0.77
Brown—below degree –0.60 0.18 0.55 –0.32 0.15 0.73 –0.37 0.21 0.69
Cameron—below degree –0.68 0.16 0.51 –0.69 0.13 0.50 –0.51 0.19 0.60
Major—no qualifications –0.11 0.19 0.90 –0.18 0.15 0.84 –0.18 0.22 0.83
Blair—no qualifications –0.46 0.17 0.63 –0.26 0.13 0.77 –0.42 0.24 0.65
Brown—no qualifications –0.58 0.22 0.56 –0.48 0.18 0.62 –0.50 0.20 0.61
Cameron—no qualifications –0.62 0.18 0.52 –0.80 0.15 0.45 –0.61 0.21 0.54
N 47,080 59,157 47,061
Nagelkerke R2 0.13 0.12 0.11
% correctly classified 64.7 62.7 62.4
Coefficients statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold
Table 3 Variations in the per-
centages agreeing that benefits
are too high and discourage
work, by period
The D rows show the difference
between the percentage in the top
and bottom rows for that variable
Thatcher Major Blair Brown Cameron
Age group
15–24 25 27 51 66 63
25–64 35 29 47 60 59
65? 50 39 57 66 64
D 25 12 6 0 1
Trade union
Member 30 26 47 65 61
Not a member 38 32 50 61 61
D 8 6 3 4 0
Qualifications
Degree 24 20 38 55 60
Below degree 37 31 52 66 63
None 37 32 50 58 66
D 13 12 12 3 6
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save space. The first two blocks of coefficients show the same trends as in Table 1: an
increase in anti-welfare sentiment over time, and more anti-welfare sentiment in all regions
except Scotland when compared to the three northern regions.
The interaction coefficients for the first two variables—the availability of jobs locally
and the level of benefits—but not for the third—lower benefits would create a greater
incentive for people to work—suggest patterns comparable to those discussed above for the
other independent variables. Virtually all of the coefficients, even those that are statistically
insignificant, are negative, with exponents less than 1.0. They indicate that, over time, the
regional divide in attitudes has narrowed. Thus, for example, the positive coefficient of
0.60 for the Midlands on the first variable in Table 4 indicates that on average across the
years when Thatcher was in office (i.e. pre-1990) respondents there were 82 per cent more
likely (an exponent of 1.82) to consider there were plenty of jobs available locally than was
the case in the Northern regions. But the four negative interaction coefficients for the
Midlands region with each of the succeeding periods indicate that that gap narrowed, more
so in the Blair than the Major years, and more so still in the Brown years, but then
reopened somewhat in the final period of coalition government.5 The same sequence
applies to the pattern of coefficients for London, the South, and Wales on that variable:
during the Major, Blair and Brown governments the gap between respondents in the North
and four other regions (Midlands, London, South, and Wales)—but not Scotland—in their
adoption of anti-welfare attitudes narrowed, with some evidence that it widened again, but
not to the same extent as in the Thatcher years, in the final period when Cameron led a
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. With a few exceptions, the same pat-
terns occur with respondents’ views on benefit levels—over time the gap between the
Northern regions and those further south in the proportion feeling that benefit levels were
too high and discouraged work (holding constant the other—individual level—independent
variables) narrowed. But—as assessed by the statistical significance of the findings—on the
third variable (whether lower benefits would create a greater incentive to work) such a
narrowing occurred only in the comparisons between the Northern regions and London.
6 And how about political leanings?
A further set of models, rather than focus on individual characteristics and regional
location in analysing changing patterns of attitudes, assessed the pattern of differences
between supporters of the three main political parties.6 In these, nine of the independent
variables included in the basic tests (Table 1) are excluded because they are significantly
related to party choice. To avoid the potential confounding effects of that collinearity, only
period was retained and a further variable added; respondents were asked which party, if
any, they identified with and these were classified into: Conservative, Labour, Liberal
Democrat, and Other/None/Don’t Know.7
5 Although the coefficients and their associated exponents are substantially different from each other, use of
the 2SE rules suggests that they are not statistically significantly different from each other, only from the
situation in the Northern regions.
6 From 1983 to 1988 the separate Liberal and Social Democratic parties operated as an Alliance: they
merged in 1988 to form, first, the Social and Liberal Democrat party—later shorted to Liberal Democrat. We
use the latter term for those various combinations and names.
7 A multinomial logistic regression equation with those nine variables as the independents and party
identification as the dependent had a Nagelkerke R2 of 0.15, with all sets of independent variables making a
highly significant contribution (a probability of 0.001 or less) to the accounting for party choice.
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Table 5 shows the results of those three binomial logistic regressions. The pattern of
coefficients for time period are as in the other analyses. Those for party identification show
that, across the full three decades, Labour supporters were significantly less likely to
display anti-welfare attitudes than were Conservative supporters (exponents of 0.33, 0.23
Table 4 Binary logistic regressions of three anti-welfare indicators against region, with interactions
Jobs for unemployed Level of benefits Incentive to work
b se exp b se exp b se exp
Constant –6.16 0.82 –3.60 0.50 1.73 0.85
Government (comparator—Thatcher)
Major –0.13 0.08 0.88 –0.17 0.05 0.85 –0.07 0.08 0.94
Blair 1.21 0.07 3.35 0.87 0.05 2.39 0.70 0.08 2.02
Brown 1.38 0.10 3.96 1.31 0.07 3.70 1.09 0.10 2.98
Cameron 0.92 0.08 2.52 1.38 0.06 4.00 1.15 0.08 3.17
Region (comparator—North)
Midlands 0.60 0.10 1.82 0.42 0.06 1.53 0.33 0.11 1.39
London 1.00 0.13 2.73 0.84 0.08 2.31 0.50 0.13 1.65
South 1.37 0.09 3.93 0.77 0.05 2.17 0.35 0.10 1.42
Wales 1.25 0.13 3.49 0.49 0.07 1.63 0.15 0.13 1.16
Scotland 0.12 0.16 1.12 0.14 0.09 1.15 0.07 0.17 1.07
Interactions
Major—Midlands –0.26 0.12 0.78 –0.10 0.08 0.90 –0.17 0.12 0.84
Blair—Midlands –0.35 0.11 0.70 –0.17 0.07 0.85 –0.12 0.11 0.89
Brown—Midlands –0.56 0.15 0.57 0.06 0.12 1.06 –0.02 0.15 0.98
Cameron—Midlands –0.46 0.12 0.63 –0.26 0.09 0.78 –0.10 0.13 0.91
Major—London –0.57 0.15 0.57 –0.19 0.10 0.83 –0.04 0.15 0.96
Blair—London –0.84 0.14 0.43 –0.89 0.09 0.41 –0.43 0.14 0.65
Brown—London –0.89 0.18 0.41 1.11 0.13 0.33 –0.66 0.18 0.51
Cameron—London –0.87 0.15 0.42 –1.03 0.10 0.36 –0.51 0.15 0.60
Major—South –0.84 0.11 0.43 –0.14 0.07 0.87 0.02 0.11 1.02
Blair—South –0.97 0.10 0.38 –0.48 0.06 0.62 –0.19 0.10 0.82
Brown—South –1.15 0.13 0.32 –0.30 0.10 0.74 –0.13 0.13 0.88
Cameron—South –1.12 0.11 0.33 –0.45 0.08 0.64 –0.17 0.11 0.84
Major—Wales –0.83 0.14 0.44 –0.19 0.10 0.83 –0.02 0.15 0.98
Blair—Wales –1.13 0.14 0.33 –0.60 0.08 0.55 –0.09 0.14 0.91
Brown—Wales –1.16 0.21 0.31 –0.40 0.17 0.67 0.16 0.21 1.17
Cameron—Wales –1.26 0.17 0.29 –0.68 0.13 0.51 –0.16 0.17 0.85
Major—Scotland 0.20 0.18 1.22 0.05 0.13 1.05 0.18 0.19 1.20
Blair—Scotland –0.11 0.17 0.90 –0.07 0.10 0.94 –0.05 0.18 0.95
Brown—Scotland –0.19 0.21 0.83 –0.14 0.15 0.87 –0.18 0.21 0.84
Cameron—Scotland –0.20 0.18 0.82 –0.32 0.13 0.72 –0.33 0.19 0.72
N 54,747 71,830 54,732
Nagelkerke R2 0.09 0.08 0.05
% correctly classified 63.3 60.2 60.2
Coefficients statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold
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and 0.33 respectively for the three dependent variables). Liberal Democrat identifiers were
also less likely to be anti-welfare than their Conservative contemporaries, though the
difference was smaller than with the Labour-Conservative comparison.
The pattern identified by the interaction coefficients is similar to that shown in Tables 2
and 4, especially so with regard to the Labour-Conservative contrast. The positive coef-
ficients shown for the Blair, Brown and Cameron years, when set against the negative
coefficients for the all-period contrast, show that the gap between the two groups narrowed
substantially, especially during the Blair and Brown Labour administrations. During those
13 years British citizens were more alike in their sharing of anti-welfare attitudes than they
were previously and, to a much lesser extent, after (when the country had either a Con-
servative or a Conservative-led government respectively). There was less narrowing of
the—albeit smaller—gap between Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, however.
The regression coefficients and their associated exponents clearly demonstrate the
narrowing of the differences in anti-welfare attitudes between political party supporters,
therefore, but neither the intensity nor the direction of that change is readily appreciated
from those statistical parameters.
Table 5 Binomial logistic regressions of three anti-welfare indicators by political party supported, with
interactions
Jobs for unemployed Level of benefits Incentive to work
b se exp b se exp b se exp
Constant 1.23 0.33 4.41 0.39 4.64 0.34
Government (comparator—Thatcher)
Major –0.51 0.05 0.60 –0.22 0.03 0.80 0.03 0.05 1.03
Blair 0.60 0.05 1.83 0.53 0.03 1.69 0.64 0.05 1.90
Brown 0.59 0.06 1.81 0.99 0.05 2.70 1.00 0.06 2.72
Cameron 0.20 0.05 1.22 1.00 0.04 2.73 1.06 0.05 2.88
Party affiliation (comparator—conservative)
Labour –1.10 0.08 0.33 –1.49 0.05 0.23 –1.11 0.09 0.33
Liberal democrat –0.82 0.15 0.44 –1.25 0.17 0.29 –1.07 0.18 0.34
Other/none –0.38 0.03 0.68 –0.80 0.02 0.45 –0.58 0.03 0.56
Interactions
Major—labour 0.20 0.09 1.22 0.10 0.06 1.11 –0.01 0.10 1.00
Blair—labour 0.46 0.08 1.59 0.49 0.05 1.64 0.25 0.09 1.29
Brown—labour 0.52 0.11 1.68 0.49 0.09 1.63 0.22 0.11 1.25
Cameron—labour 0.51 0.09 1.66 0.41 0.07 1.51 0.20 0.10 1.22
Major—LibDem 0.14 0.16 1.15 0.42 0.18 1.51 0.28 0.19 1.32
Blair—LibDem 0.26 0.16 1.29 0.49 0.18 1.63 0.19 0.19 1.21
Brown—LibDem 0.17 0.19 1.18 0.32 0.21 1.37 –0.01 0.22 0.99
Cameron—LibDem 0.15 0.17 1.16 0.44 0.19 1.55 0.16 0.20 1.17
N 54,747 71,830 54,732
Nagelkerke R2 0.11 0.13 0.09
% correctly classified 63.2 62.6 62.7
Statistically significant coefficients at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold
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An alternative means of portraying the changes is given in Table 6, which uses the
regression coefficients and exponents in Table 5 to estimate the probability that supporters
of each of the three main parties agreed with the statement that there were plenty of local
jobs available. The main shift was clearly among Labour supporters, who became sub-
stantially more anti-welfare, especially in the post-Major years, than supporters of either
the Conservatives or the Liberal Democrats. The British population generally was
becoming more right-wing in its attitudes and the three parties’ supporters were coalescing
around an anti-welfare—or pro-workfare—position.
7 Discussion and conclusions
Three main conclusions emerge from these analyses. The first is that British citizens
became substantially more anti-welfare and, implicitly, pro-workfare—or, in other ter-
minologies, more right-wing or neo-liberal—over the last three decades, especially during
the Labour administrations led by Blair and Brown. Secondly, this rightward move not
only involved most groups within society (defined by age, trade union membership,
occupational class etc.); in addition the attitudinal gaps within each of those groups nar-
rowed during the Blair-Brown years, as did the gap between the regions. The country had
become more homogeneously anti-welfare by 2010 than it had been during the Thatcher
and, especially, Major administrations—with that gap only widening slightly under the
Conservative-led post-2010 coalition government. Finally, the increase in anti-welfare
attitudes was significantly greater among Labour than Conservative party supporters. By
contrast, Bromley and Curtice (1999)—using BSA data—found no evidence that Blair’s
‘Third Way’ (Giddens 1998) had gained popular support, particularly among Labour
voters. Our analysis suggests, however, that a shift towards neo-liberal values had started
under Major and continued apace under Blair and Brown. Similarly, comparing data for
1996, 1998 and 2000, Hills (2001) found that after a convergence in attitudes between the
first two dates, in 2000 there was again a wide gap between those Labour supporters who
thought benefit levels for the unemployed were too high and those who thought them too
low. Our findings therefore help to shed new light on relations between party policies,
popular attitudes and their political impact but interestingly our findings appear to con-
tradict ‘thermostatic’ expectations, to a degree. As governments have moved right over the
past thirty years, public attitudes have failed to tack left.
In 2012, therefore, during a period of substantial unemployment (7.9 per cent of the
economically active population—the highest since 1996), some 60 per cent of respondents
to the British Social Attitudes survey claimed that people could finds jobs in their local
area if they really wanted one, more than twice the figure only twenty years previously,
Table 6 The estimated probability of supporters of each political party agreeing that there are enough jobs
available locally, by government period
Period Thatcher Major Blair Brown Cameron
Party supported
Conservative 0.77 0.67 0.86 0.86 0.81
Labour 0.53 0.46 0.77 0.78 0.70
Liberal democrat 0.60 0.51 0.78 0.76 0.68
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when unemployment was even higher (at 9.8 per cent). This shift—commensurate with the
attack on ‘shirkers’ in the government’s rhetoric after 2010—was paralleled by similar
major changes in attitudes to the financial and other benefits available to the unemployed:
there was a similar doubling in the percentage of respondents who believed benefits were
too high and discouraged work, and in the percentage who thought that the benefit system’s
generosity meant that people were too dependent on the state and insufficiently willing to
‘stand on their own two feet’.
These attitudinal shifts have not stimulated greater polarisation within British society,
between supporters and opponents of a generous welfare state, however. Instead, they have
been associated with a narrowing of the attitudinal gaps between most socio-demographic
and -economic groups, as many of those with ‘left’ leaning and ‘liberal’ positions on such
issues have moved considerably rightwards, towards those from whom their opinions were
diametrically opposed only a few decades ago: those moves are reflected in the closing
attitudinal gaps between the country’s regions and supporters of the main political parties.
A major theme of the post-2010 coalition government’s rhetoric in promoting its austerity
programme to counter the UK’s major budget deficit and national debt crisis following the
banking crashes of 2008–2009 was ‘we’re all in it together’. Although the evidence is very
clearly that neither the post-2008 recession nor the post-2010 austerity programme had an
equal impact across all parts of society, nevertheless some elements of the rhetoric had
been adopted, long before the events of 2008 and their aftermath. Britain had already
become more homogeneous—and in many ways more right-wing—in its attitudes to
welfarism.
Why should this be; why this very substantial shift—and why did it happen when it did,
very rapidly, under the New Labour governments of 1997–2010? Such substantial ideo-
logical changes are unlikely to have been endogenous. Were they stimulated by those who
rewrote the political agenda—notably Blair and others in their post-1994 promotion of
New Labour; and if so, should the shift not have been much clearer, sooner, in the 1980s
when an earlier generation of—Conservative—politicians also sought to change political
attitudes? (Crewe—1988, 35—for example, concluded his study of attitudes in the 1980s
that ‘‘the public has not been converted to Thatcherism—not to its priorities, not to its
economic reasoning, not to its social values’’.) Why did the changes not come about until
the first ten years of New Labour governments—years of substantial economic growth and
widespread prosperity (with significant redistribution of income, despite one leading
Labour party politician indicating he was ‘‘intensely relaxed about people getting filthy
rich … as long as they pay their taxes’’; Hills 2014)? Did New Labour politicians lead
public opinion and, if not (given the unlikelihood of such a major shift without some clear
leadership), were the media the crucial animateurs of changed public opinion that the
politicians responded to? And was the public more amenable at that time because the
period of prosperity (initiated from 1994 under Major’s Conservative governments and
sustained during the decade when Gordon Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer) meant
that fewer people than in the preceding three decades had made calls upon the unem-
ployment and related aspects of the benefit system so that they were more susceptible to
media claims that a small minority was unfairly benefiting from—if not actively
defrauding—the benefit system?
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, other major changes in British society
were also stimulating attitudinal changes—promulgated through not only the media but
increasingly by political parties, to a considerable extent responding to claims made by the
United Kingdom Independence Party regarding the impact of immigration, especially post-
2004 unregulated immigration from within the European Union, on the British economy
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and welfare system. Access to social housing was regulated for much of the twentieth
century by a waiting list procedure, for example, with only a relatively small number of
urgent cases based on need allowed to ‘jump the queue’. But this was changed, as less
social housing became available following the success of the ‘Right-to-Buy’ policy
introduced by the Thatcher government in 1980, to a needs-based allocation system. Thus
older people who had paid into ‘their’ welfare state—as they saw it—through the national
insurance system and assumed that they and their children would be major beneficiaries,
saw other groups—notably immigrants, many with large families—getting accelerated
access: ‘their’ welfare state’s benefits—in access to schooling and the National Health
Service as well as housing—were being denied to them and their families by immigrants
and perceptions of this inequity fuelled their growing opposition to the welfare state and
EU immigration dominating the ‘Brexit’ referendum debate. (For examples of this shift,
see Dench et al. 2006; Kearns et al. 2014, have generalised Dench et al.’s argument by
showing that attitudes to welfare in 2009 varied not only by socio-economic group but also
neighbourhood context.)
Uncovering the mechanisms whereby the shift from welfare to workfare promoted by
some politicians since the late 1970s has been adopted by the British population, partic-
ularly since the mid-1990s, and the relative role of economic prosperity, media portrayals
of an underclass that has largely opted out of the workforce to live on benefits that are
perceived as more generous than wages, is beyond the remit of this paper. The analyses
reported here have identified a very substantial shift away from welfare and towards
workfare that the Thatcher governments tried to initiate, which began to take effect under
John Major but was achieved—and sustained—by the New Labour administrations of Blair
and Brown and has not since been undermined by Conservative austerity, strongly anti-
welfare policies that have been masked by the political rhetoric of social cohesion (cf.
Ferragina and Arrigoni 2016). Society has converged on anti-welfare attitudes, reducing
the spatial divide that has long characterised Great Britain and substantially altering the
contest between the political parties.
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